doc/sandbox.rst
The sandbox extension can be used to evaluate untrusted code.
Register the SandboxExtension extension via the addExtension() method::
$twig->addExtension(new \Twig\Extension\SandboxExtension($policy));
The sandbox security is managed by a policy instance, which must be passed to
the SandboxExtension constructor.
By default, Twig comes with one policy class: \Twig\Sandbox\SecurityPolicy.
This class allows you to allow-list some tags, filters, functions, and
properties and methods on objects::
$tags = ['if'];
$filters = ['upper'];
$methods = [
'Article' => ['getTitle', 'getBody'],
];
$properties = [
'Article' => ['title', 'body'],
];
$functions = ['range'];
$tests = ['my_test'];
$policy = new \Twig\Sandbox\SecurityPolicy($tags, $filters, $methods, $properties, $functions, $tests);
With the above configuration, the security policy will only allow usage of the
if tag, the upper filter, and the my_test test (on top of the
built-in tests that are always allowed, see below). Moreover, the templates
will only be able to call the getTitle() and getBody() methods on
Article objects, and the title and body public properties.
Everything else won't be allowed and will generate a
\Twig\Sandbox\SecurityError exception.
.. note::
The ``allowedTests`` argument is available since Twig 3.28 (in earlier
versions all tests were always allowed). Most built-in tests (``empty``,
``defined``, ``even``, ``same as``, ``iterable``, etc.) are always allowed
and do not need to be listed. Only custom tests and the built-in
``constant`` test must be allow-listed like filters and functions.
.. note::
As of Twig 3.14.1 (and on Twig 3.11.2), if the ``Article`` class implements
the ``ArrayAccess`` interface, the templates will only be able to access
the ``title`` and ``body`` attributes.
Note that native array-like classes (like ``ArrayObject``) are always
allowed, you don't need to configure them.
.. caution::
The ``extends`` and ``use`` tags, the ``parent``, ``block``, and
``attribute`` functions, the ``constant`` test, and any custom test are
always allowed in a sandboxed template. That behavior will change in 4.0
where they will need to be explicitly allowed like any other tag, filter,
function, or test. To opt-in to the 4.0 behavior now (so they need to be
allow-listed or get rejected), enable strict mode on the security policy::
$policy->setStrict(true);
.. versionadded:: 3.28
The ``always_allowed_in_sandbox`` option for filters, functions, and tests,
and the ``isAlwaysAllowedInSandbox()`` method for token parsers, were added
in Twig 3.28.
Some filters, functions, tests, and tags are inherently safe and should always
be usable in sandboxed templates without forcing every policy to allow-list
them. Mark such callables by setting the always_allowed_in_sandbox option
to true::
$twig->addFilter(new \Twig\TwigFilter('upper', 'strtoupper', [
'always_allowed_in_sandbox' => true,
]));
$twig->addFunction(new \Twig\TwigFunction('max', 'max', [
'always_allowed_in_sandbox' => true,
]));
$twig->addTest(new \Twig\TwigTest('even', null, [
'always_allowed_in_sandbox' => true,
]));
For tags, override isAlwaysAllowedInSandbox() on your token parser to
return true::
final class MyTagTokenParser extends \Twig\TokenParser\AbstractTokenParser
{
public function isAlwaysAllowedInSandbox(): bool
{
return true;
}
// ...
}
Marked filters, functions, tests, and tags are skipped by the sandbox security
check entirely, so they incur no runtime overhead, and they do not need to be
listed in the SecurityPolicy allow-lists.
The sandbox assumes that attackers control template source, not the Twig environment, registered extensions, runtime configuration, security policy, custom escaping strategies, or context values passed by the application. Treat those application-provided pieces as trusted. If a callable or a value is not safe for untrusted template authors, don't register or expose it in the sandboxed environment.
Criteria for Marking an Item as Always Allowed
Only mark a callable or tag as always allowed when **all** the following
conditions hold:
* **No new capability.** The item must not expose anything beyond what the
sandbox already accepts. Pure value predicates (``is even``, ``is empty``),
pure value transformations (``upper``, ``trim``, ``abs``), and pure control
flow (``if``, ``for``, ``set``) qualify.
* **No PHP runtime access.** The item must not read arbitrary PHP constants,
call arbitrary classes or functions, instantiate objects from
user-controlled names, or otherwise reach into the PHP runtime. This rules
out ``constant``, ``enum``, ``invoke``, and similar.
* **No callable arguments.** The item must not accept a callable parameter it
dispatches to. This rules out higher-order operations like ``map``,
``filter``, ``reduce``, ``find``, ``sort``, and ``column``: applications may
have deliberate reasons to forbid those, and they need the policy gate to do
so.
* **No cross-template resolution.** The item must not resolve template names
at runtime or pivot through the loader. This rules out ``include``,
``extends``, ``embed``, ``use``, ``import``, ``from``, ``source``, and
``template_from_string``.
* **No output-safety bypass.** The item must not let the template declare
its own output safe. This rules out ``raw``.
* **No dedicated introspection or debugging surface.** The item must not be
intended to dump arbitrary object internals or call user-defined
serialization hooks. This rules out ``json_encode`` and ``dump``.
* **No side effects on the PHP environment.** The item must not flush
output buffers, trigger deprecations, or otherwise affect global state.
This rules out ``flush`` and ``deprecated``.
* **Deterministic output.** The item must return the same value for the same
arguments across renders. Applications that rely on sandboxed templates being
reproducible (for caching, content hashing, golden-output tests, or audit
comparisons) lose that property if a template can pull from the PHP random
number generator without the policy opting in. This rules out ``random`` and
``shuffle``: applications that want them can still allow-list them
explicitly.
Note that several allowed items will still interact with PHP interfaces on
objects passed as arguments (``Countable::count()``,
``IteratorAggregate::getIterator()``, ``Stringable::__toString()`` on
iterated items). That transitive behavior is documented separately under
:ref:`Allowed Operations Apply Transitively to Their Arguments
<allowed-operations-transitive>` and is considered an accepted property of
the sandbox model. The criteria above are about what the item itself
exposes, not about how its arguments behave.
Built-ins That Will Be Always Allowed in 4.0
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The following Twig built-ins meet the criteria above and will have the
``always_allowed_in_sandbox`` flag set in Twig 4.0. They still need to be
explicitly allow-listed in 3.x.
* Tags: ``apply``, ``block``, ``do``, ``for``, ``guard``, ``if``, ``macro``,
``set``, ``types``, ``with``.
* Filters: ``abs``, ``batch``, ``capitalize``, ``convert_encoding``,
``default``, ``e``, ``escape``, ``first``, ``format``, ``join``, ``keys``,
``last``, ``length``, ``lower``, ``merge``, ``nl2br``, ``number_format``,
``replace``, ``reverse``, ``round``, ``slice``, ``split``, ``striptags``,
``title``, ``trim``, ``upper``, ``url_encode``.
* Functions: ``cycle``, ``max``, ``min``.
When upgrading to 4.0, you can drop these names from your ``SecurityPolicy``
allow-lists. Leaving them in is harmless: listing a name that is always
allowed has no effect.
The corresponding built-in tests (``defined``, ``divisible by``, ``empty``,
``even``, ``iterable``, ``mapping``, ``none``, ``null``, ``odd``, ``same as``,
``sequence``, ``true``) are **already** flagged as always allowed since Twig
3.28, so they never need to be allow-listed. This is safe because tests were
never enforced by the sandbox before 3.28: flagging them keeps existing
templates working unchanged. The ``constant`` test is the exception: it reaches
into the PHP runtime, so it is not always allowed and must be allow-listed (it
is still implicitly allowed in 3.x with a deprecation, and rejected in 4.0).
Enabling the Sandbox
--------------------
By default, the sandbox mode is disabled and should be enabled when including
untrusted template code by using the ``sandboxed`` option of the ``include``
function:
.. code-block:: twig
{{ include('user.html.twig', sandboxed: true) }}
You can sandbox all templates by passing ``true`` as the second argument of
the extension constructor::
$twig->addExtension(new \Twig\Extension\SandboxExtension($policy, true));
.. _allowed-operations-transitive:
Allowed Operations Apply Transitively to Their Arguments
--------------------------------------------------------
The method and property allow-lists only restrict attribute access written
explicitly in the template (``obj.foo`` and ``obj.foo()``). Once an object is
passed as an argument to an allowed tag, filter, function, or test, that
operation can interact with it in any way PHP allows, without going through
the sandbox allow-list.
This is especially easy to miss for implicit calls made through PHP
interfaces. For example, allowing ``json_encode`` may expose public object
properties and call ``JsonSerializable::jsonSerialize()``; allowing sequence
operations such as ``for``, ``keys``, ``slice``, ``random``, or ``join`` may
call ``IteratorAggregate::getIterator()``, ``Iterator`` methods, or
``Countable::count()``; allowing ``cycle`` with an ``ArrayAccess`` value may
call ``offsetGet()``; allowing ``url_encode`` on arrays may expose public
object properties through PHP's query-string serialization; allowing ``max``
or ``min`` may compare objects by their public properties. None of these calls
appear in the template source.
Only allow operations whose behavior is safe for the objects you expose to
sandboxed templates. If this is not guaranteed, convert objects to plain
arrays or scalars before passing them in.
Limiting Resource Usage
-----------------------
The sandbox prevents untrusted templates from reaching code, data, methods, or
properties they shouldn't. It does **not** prevent a template from consuming
CPU, memory, or wall-clock time, even under the strictest allow-list.
This is by design: any limit baked into Twig itself would be both arbitrary
and trivial to work around, since there are many ways a template can burn
resources (large ranges, nested loops, large string operations, recursive
macros, expensive filters, deeply nested includes, and so on).
If you render untrusted templates, you should contain them at the process level
rather than at the template engine level.
Accepting Callables Arguments
-----------------------------
The Twig sandbox allows you to configure which functions, filters, tests and
dot operations are allowed. Many of these calls can accept arguments. As these
arguments are not validated by the sandbox, you must be very careful.
For instance, accepting a PHP ``callable`` as an argument is dangerous as it
allows end user to call any PHP function (by passing a ``string``) or any
static methods (by passing an ``array``). For instance, it would accept any PHP
built-in functions like ``system()`` or ``exec()``::
$twig->addFilter(new \Twig\TwigFilter('custom', function (callable $callable) {
// ...
$callable();
// ...
}));
To avoid this security issue, don't type-hint such arguments with ``callable``
but use ``\Closure`` instead (not using a type-hint would also be problematic).
This restricts the allowed callables to PHP closures only, which is enough to
accept Twig arrow functions::
$twig->addFilter(new \Twig\TwigFilter('custom', function (\Closure $callable) {
// ...
$callable();
// ...
}));
{{ people|custom(p => p.username|join(', ') }}
Any PHP callable can easily be converted to a closure by using the `first-class callable syntax`_.
.. _`first-class callable syntax`: https://www.php.net/manual/en/functions.first_class_callable_syntax.php