docs/deploy/secrets.md
Paperclip encrypts secrets at rest using a local master key. Agent environment variables that contain sensitive values (API keys, tokens) are stored as encrypted secret references.
Paperclip protects secret values up to the moment they are handed to an agent or workload:
Once a value reaches the consuming process, Paperclip can no longer guarantee secrecy. The agent (or sandbox, or remote host) can read the value, write it to its own logs or transcript, or pass it to downstream tools. Treat any secret you bind to an agent as exposed to that agent. Limit blast radius with bindings (only bind what each agent needs), short-lived provider credentials where the provider supports them, and rotation when an agent transcript or downstream system might have captured a value.
Creating a company secret does not automatically create an environment variable. You use a secret by binding it into an agent, project, environment, or plugin configuration field that supports secret references.
For agent and project environment variables:
Company Settings > Secrets.Environment variables field, or the project's Env
field.GH_TOKEN or
OPENAI_API_KEY.Secret, select the stored secret, and choose either
latest or a pinned version.At runtime, Paperclip resolves the selected secret server-side and injects the resolved value under the env key from the binding row. The stored secret name can be human-readable; the binding key is what the agent process receives.
Project env applies to every issue run in that project. When a project env key
matches an agent env key, the project value wins before Paperclip injects its
own PAPERCLIP_* runtime variables.
local_encryptedSecrets are encrypted with a local master key stored at:
~/.paperclip/instances/default/secrets/master.key
This key is auto-created during onboarding. The key never leaves your machine.
Paperclip best-effort enforces 0600 permissions when it creates or loads the
key file. paperclipai doctor and the provider health API warn when the file is
readable by group or other users.
Back up the key file together with database backups. A database backup without the key cannot decrypt local secrets, and a key backup without the database metadata is not enough to restore named secret versions.
Onboarding writes default secrets config:
pnpm paperclipai onboard
Update secrets settings:
pnpm paperclipai configure --section secrets
Validate secrets config:
pnpm paperclipai doctor
pnpm paperclipai secrets doctor --company-id <company-id>
| Variable | Description |
|---|---|
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY | 32-byte key as base64, hex, or raw string |
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY_FILE | Custom key file path |
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_STRICT_MODE | Set to true to enforce secret refs |
When strict mode is enabled, sensitive env keys (matching *_API_KEY, *_TOKEN, *_SECRET) must use secret references instead of inline plain values.
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_STRICT_MODE=true
Recommended for any deployment beyond local trusted.
Authenticated deployments default strict mode on unless explicitly overridden by
configuration or PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_STRICT_MODE=false.
Provider-owned secrets can be linked without copying values into Paperclip by
using managedMode: "external_reference" plus a provider externalRef.
Paperclip stores metadata and a non-sensitive fingerprint, never the value.
Runtime resolution remains server-side and binding-enforced.
The built-in AWS, GCP, and Vault provider IDs currently accept external reference metadata, but runtime resolution requires provider configuration in the deployment. Their provider health check reports this as a warning until configured.
For hosted Paperclip Cloud on AWS, see the AWS Secrets Manager operational
contract — required env vars, IAM/KMS scoping, naming and tag conventions, and
backup/rotation/incident runbooks — in doc/SECRETS-AWS-PROVIDER.md.
A provider vault is a named, company-scoped configuration that points secret material at one of the supported provider backends. Each company can configure multiple vaults, including more than one vault per provider family, and pick a default vault per family for new secret operations. Existing secrets created before any vault was configured continue to resolve through the deployment-level default provider — no migration is required.
Open Company Settings → Secrets in the board UI and switch to the
Provider vaults tab. From there you can:
The same operations are exposed under
/api/companies/{companyId}/secret-provider-configs for automation. See the
secrets API reference for the full route table.
Provider vaults intentionally store only non-sensitive configuration:
region, project id, namespace, prefix, KMS key id, mount path, address, and
similar routing metadata. The API, UI, and activity log never accept, return,
or display provider credential values. Submitting fields with names like
accessKeyId, secretAccessKey, token, password, serviceAccountJson,
privateKey, keyFile, unsealKey, or any common credential alias is rejected
at validation time.
That keeps the bootstrap rule from the AWS provider applicable to every
provider family: provider credentials live in deployment infrastructure
identity, not in Paperclip company secrets. Allowed credential sources are
workload identity attached to the Paperclip server (instance profile, IRSA, ECS
task role), AWS_PROFILE / SSO / shared config for local runs, an orchestrator
secret store that boots the server, or short-lived shell credentials for local
development. Do not paste long-lived API keys into the vault config.
Each vault carries a status that drives what the runtime can do with it:
| Status | Meaning |
|---|---|
ready | Selectable for create/rotate/resolve. Eligible to be the default. |
warning | Saved config exists but health needs attention (for example missing AWS env). Still selectable. |
coming_soon | Visible and editable as draft metadata, but locked out of all runtime operations. |
disabled | Soft-deleted. Hidden from the secret create/rotate flow. |
gcp_secret_manager and vault are pinned to coming_soon until their
runtime modules ship. The settings UI lets you save draft configuration for
those providers (and surfaces them on the vault list), but secret create,
rotate, and resolve calls that target a coming-soon vault fail with a clear
runtime-locked error.
A company can mark one ready (or warning) vault per provider family as the default. The secret create and rotate dialogs preselect the default vault for the chosen provider so operators don't have to remember which vault to pick. Coming-soon and disabled vaults cannot be marked default; attempting to do so returns a validation error. Setting a new default automatically clears the previous default for that provider.
If a secret is created without any providerConfigId (no vaults exist yet, or
the operator clears the selector), runtime resolution falls back to the
deployment-level provider configuration — the same path existing installs use.
This keeps secrets created before any provider vault was configured working
without migration. Picking the default in the UI is an explicit selection, not
a runtime fallback: the create call still sends an explicit providerConfigId.
Multiple vaults from the same provider family are first-class. Common patterns:
Each vault has its own display name, status, default flag, and health record. Operators choose the vault explicitly when creating or rotating a secret; the default vault is preselected to avoid accidental routing to the wrong account.
POST /api/secret-provider-configs/{id}/health runs a provider-specific health
probe and stores the result on the vault row. The settings UI exposes the same
action and renders the result inline. Health responses include a status,
operator-facing message, and structured guidance (such as missing env var
names, expected credential sources, and backup reminders). They never include
provider credentials or secret values. Coming-soon vaults always return a
runtime_locked health code and never call into provider modules.
Local encrypted vaults wrap the existing local_encrypted provider. The
master key path and rotation guidance described above still applies. A local
vault config is mostly bookkeeping plus an explicit acknowledgement that the
key file is backed up alongside the database.
AWS Secrets Manager vaults read the per-vault region, namespace,
secretNamePrefix, kmsKeyId, ownerTag, and environmentTag to route
managed writes and external-reference reads. The vault config supplements (and
can override) the deployment-level PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_* env. Bootstrap
credentials still come from the AWS SDK default credential chain — see
doc/SECRETS-AWS-PROVIDER.md for the full IAM and KMS contract.
GCP Secret Manager and HashiCorp Vault vaults are coming soon. You can
save draft projectId, location, namespace, address, and mountPath
metadata so the company is ready to flip them on when the provider modules
ship. Vault address values must be origin-only http(s)://host[:port] URLs;
addresses with embedded credentials, paths, query strings, or fragments are
rejected.
AWS provider vaults can import existing AWS Secrets Manager entries as
Paperclip external_reference secrets. This is a metadata-only link: Paperclip
stores the AWS ARN/path, a fingerprint/version reference, and binding metadata.
It does not read, copy, store, log, or display the remote plaintext secret
value during preview or import.
Operator flow in the board UI:
Company Settings -> Secrets.ready or warning.Secrets tab, choose Import from vault.The preview list is intentionally paged and search-first. AWS accounts can have
large per-Region inventories, and ListSecrets returns opaque NextToken
cursors. Do not expect Paperclip to crawl a whole account in the background;
load pages deliberately and retry throttled requests with backoff.
Remote import exposes AWS secret metadata visible to the Paperclip runtime role, including names/ARNs and safe derived fields such as dates, whether a description or KMS key exists, and tag count. Treat names, ARNs, tags, and search text as operational metadata that may be sensitive. The API and activity log must not store raw descriptions, tags, plaintext values, provider credentials, or raw AWS error blobs.
Required AWS posture:
secretsmanager:ListSecrets permission on
Resource: "*". AWS does not support constraining ListSecrets to
individual secret ARNs or tags as an IAM boundary.secretsmanager:GetSecretValue,
secretsmanager:BatchGetSecretValue, or KMS decrypt.secretsmanager:GetSecretValue on the selected external ARN/path and KMS
decrypt when that secret uses a customer-managed key.Safe scoping comes from deployment posture rather than AWS list filtering: dedicated Paperclip runtime roles per environment/account, AWS vaults pointed at the intended account and Region, import-enabled roles only where inventory exposure is acceptable, and board-only access to the import routes. Tags and name filters are search aids, not a permission model.
If import preview fails:
AccessDenied or not authorized: the runtime role is missing
secretsmanager:ListSecrets; add the optional inventory statement only if
remote import should be enabled for that vault.NextToken values are opaque and
can expire or become stale.GetSecretValue and KMS
decrypt scope for the selected external secret. Being visible in inventory is
not proof that the runtime role can read the value.Each provider family has a different backup story:
local_encrypted: back up the local master key file and the Paperclip
database together. Either alone is not enough to restore the encrypted
values, and the vault row only records the path and acknowledgement, not the
key bytes.aws_secrets_manager: back up Paperclip's database for vault metadata
(vault id, region, prefix, KMS key id, default flag, bindings, version
pointers). The actual secret values live in AWS Secrets Manager under the
configured prefix; restore by pointing the same Paperclip company at the
same AWS namespace and confirming the runtime role still has
GetSecretValue plus KMS decrypt. The full restore checklist lives in
doc/SECRETS-AWS-PROVIDER.md.gcp_secret_manager and vault: while these are coming soon, only the
draft vault config exists in Paperclip. Database backups capture it. There
is nothing to restore on the provider side until runtime support lands.The AWS Secrets Manager provider cannot bootstrap itself from Paperclip
company_secrets. Its initial AWS access must be present before the server can
create or resolve AWS-backed company secrets, regardless of whether you use the
deployment-level default or a per-company vault.
For Paperclip Cloud, provision the server runtime IAM role/workload identity,
KMS key, deployment prefix, and non-secret PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_* environment
configuration before enabling AWS-backed secrets in the board UI. For
self-hosted and local runs, use the AWS SDK default credential chain: instance
profile, ECS task role, EKS IRSA/OIDC web identity, AWS SSO/shared config via
AWS_PROFILE, or short-lived shell credentials for local development.
Do not store AWS root credentials or long-lived IAM user access keys in Paperclip secrets. Bootstrap material belongs in infrastructure IAM/workload identity, the process environment, an AWS profile, or the orchestrator secret store.
If you have existing agents with inline API keys in their config, migrate them to encrypted secret refs:
pnpm paperclipai secrets migrate-inline-env --company-id <company-id>
pnpm paperclipai secrets migrate-inline-env --company-id <company-id> --apply
# low-level script for direct database maintenance
pnpm secrets:migrate-inline-env # dry run
pnpm secrets:migrate-inline-env --apply # apply migration
Use the CLI command for normal operations because it goes through the Paperclip API, creates or rotates secret records, and updates agent env bindings with audit logging.
Company exports include only environment declarations. They do not include secret IDs, provider references, encrypted material, or plaintext values.
pnpm paperclipai secrets declarations --company-id <company-id> --kind secret
Before importing a package into another instance, use those declarations to create local values or link hosted provider references in the target deployment. For hosted providers such as AWS Secrets Manager, the hosted provider remains the value custodian; Paperclip stores metadata and provider version references, not provider credentials or plaintext secret values.
Agent environment variables use secret references:
{
"env": {
"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY": {
"type": "secret_ref",
"secretId": "8f884973-c29b-44e4-8ea3-6413437f8081",
"version": "latest"
}
}
}
The server resolves and decrypts these at runtime, injecting the real value into the agent process environment.