AWS Secrets Manager Provider

Operational contract for the hosted aws_secrets_manager secret provider used by Paperclip Cloud.

Scope

• Hosted provider for Paperclip-managed secrets when Paperclip Cloud runs on AWS.
• Source of truth for secret values is AWS Secrets Manager, not Postgres.
• Paperclip stores only metadata needed for ownership, bindings, version selection, audit, and runtime resolution.
• AWS provider bootstrap credentials are deployment/runtime credentials, not Paperclip-managed company secrets.
• Remote import for existing AWS secrets is metadata-only. Preview/import uses AWS inventory metadata and creates Paperclip external references; it does not copy plaintext into Paperclip.
• Per-company AWS provider vaults (named instances of aws_secrets_manager with their own region, namespace, prefix, KMS key id, and tags) are managed in the board UI under Company Settings → Secrets → Provider vaults. See Provider Vaults for the operator model and Provider Vaults API for the routes. The bootstrap trust model in this document still applies — vault config carries non-sensitive routing metadata only, never AWS credentials.

Bootstrap Trust Model

The AWS provider has a chicken-and-egg boundary: Paperclip cannot use company_secrets to unlock the AWS provider that stores those secrets. The initial AWS trust must exist before the Paperclip server starts.

Allowed bootstrap locations:

• Infrastructure IAM or workload identity attached to the Paperclip server runtime.
• Process environment or orchestrator secret store used to start the Paperclip server.
• Local AWS SDK sources such as AWS_PROFILE, AWS SSO/shared config, web identity, container metadata, or instance metadata.
• Short-lived shell credentials for local development only.

Do not ask operators to paste AWS root credentials or long-lived IAM user access keys into the Paperclip board UI. Do not store those bootstrap keys in company_secrets.

Paperclip Cloud Bootstrap

Paperclip Cloud must provision the AWS backing resources before any board user can create AWS-backed company secrets:

1. Create or select the deployment KMS key.
2. Create the Paperclip server runtime role for the deployment.
3. Attach a minimum IAM policy scoped to the deployment Secrets Manager prefix and the configured KMS key.
4. Configure the server runtime with the non-secret provider environment variables below.
5. Run paperclipai doctor or the provider health endpoint from the deployed runtime and confirm that the provider reports the expected region, prefix, deployment id, KMS setting, and AWS SDK credential source.

Once this is in place, the board UI can create Paperclip-managed AWS secrets and Paperclip will write them under the deployment/company namespace.

Self-Hosted And Local Bootstrap

Self-hosted AWS deployments should use the AWS SDK default credential provider chain. Preferred sources are role-based:

• EC2 instance profile.
• ECS task role.
• EKS IRSA or another OIDC web identity role.
• AWS SSO/shared config via AWS_PROFILE.

Local development can use:

aws sso login --profile paperclip-dev
AWS_PROFILE=paperclip-dev \
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_PROVIDER=aws_secrets_manager \
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_REGION=us-east-1 \
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_DEPLOYMENT_ID=dev-local \
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_KMS_KEY_ID=arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/abcd-... \
pnpm dev

Temporary AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID/AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY environment credentials are acceptable only as a local break-glass or short-lived test source. They should not be written to Paperclip config, committed to .env files, stored in company_secrets, or used as the default Paperclip Cloud bootstrap path.

Deployment Config

Required environment variables:

PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_PROVIDER=aws_secrets_manager
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_REGION=us-east-1
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_DEPLOYMENT_ID=prod-us-1
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_KMS_KEY_ID=arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/abcd-...

Optional environment variables:

PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_PREFIX=paperclip
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_ENVIRONMENT=production
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_PROVIDER_OWNER=paperclip
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_ENDPOINT=
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_DELETE_RECOVERY_DAYS=30

Naming convention for Paperclip-managed secrets:

paperclip/{deploymentId}/{companyId}/{secretKey}

Tag set for Paperclip-managed secrets:

• paperclip:managed-by=paperclip
• paperclip:provider-owner=<owner tag>
• paperclip:deployment-id=<deployment id>
• paperclip:company-id=<company id>
• paperclip:secret-key=<secret key>
• paperclip:environment=<environment tag>

IAM And KMS Assumptions

Launch posture:

• One Paperclip app role per deployment.
• One deployment-scoped KMS key per deployment at launch.
• Future per-company KMS keys remain compatible because Paperclip stores provider refs and version metadata separately from values.

Minimum IAM boundary:

• Allow secretsmanager:CreateSecret, PutSecretValue, GetSecretValue, and DeleteSecret.
• Scope resources to the deployment prefix:

arn:aws:secretsmanager:<region>:<account-id>:secret:paperclip/<deployment-id>/*

• Allow kms:Encrypt, kms:Decrypt, kms:GenerateDataKey, and kms:DescribeKey for the configured deployment CMK.
• Deny wildcard access outside the deployment prefix.
• Prefer workload identity / role-based auth. Do not store AWS credentials inline in Paperclip config.

Example minimum policy shape:

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "PaperclipDeploymentSecrets",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "secretsmanager:CreateSecret",
        "secretsmanager:PutSecretValue",
        "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
        "secretsmanager:DeleteSecret"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:<region>:<account-id>:secret:paperclip/<deployment-id>/*"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "PaperclipDeploymentKms",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "kms:Encrypt",
        "kms:Decrypt",
        "kms:GenerateDataKey",
        "kms:DescribeKey"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:kms:<region>:<account-id>:key/<key-id>"
    }
  ]
}

Operational expectation:

• Paperclip-managed secrets may be deleted only by Paperclip or an operator with equivalent break-glass access.
• External references may resolve through Paperclip runtime, but Paperclip should not delete the external secret resource.

Remote Import Inventory IAM

Remote import preview needs one additional AWS permission:

{
  "Sid": "PaperclipRemoteSecretInventory",
  "Effect": "Allow",
  "Action": "secretsmanager:ListSecrets",
  "Resource": "*"
}

This is intentionally separate from the managed create/rotate/delete policy. AWS treats ListSecrets as an account/Region inventory action; do not document secret ARNs, names, tags, or AWS request filters as an IAM boundary for it. Use Resource: "*" and decide whether inventory exposure is acceptable for the AWS account and Region behind each provider vault.

Remote import preview/import must not call:

• secretsmanager:GetSecretValue
• secretsmanager:BatchGetSecretValue
• kms:Decrypt

Those permissions are only needed later when a bound runtime resolves an imported external reference. For imported refs, scope read permissions to the operator-approved external prefixes that Paperclip is allowed to consume:

{
  "Sid": "PaperclipResolveImportedExternalReferences",
  "Effect": "Allow",
  "Action": "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
  "Resource": [
    "arn:aws:secretsmanager:<region>:<account-id>:secret:<approved-external-prefix>/*"
  ]
}

If selected external secrets use customer-managed KMS keys, also grant kms:Decrypt and kms:DescribeKey on those keys. Keep managed write/delete permissions scoped to paperclip/<deployment-id>/*; do not broaden them for remote import.

Safe scoping guidance:

• Prefer one Paperclip runtime role per environment/account.
• Point provider vaults at the intended AWS account and Region instead of a broad central admin role.
• Enable ListSecrets only in accounts where inventory exposure is acceptable.
• Keep preview/import board-only; agent API keys must not call these routes.
• Treat AWS tag/name filters as search UX only, not permission enforcement.

Paperclip also blocks importing refs under its own managed namespace as external references. Use the Paperclip-managed flow for paperclip/{deploymentId}/{companyId}/{secretKey} resources.

Existing AWS Secrets

V1 keeps existing AWS Secrets Manager entries as linked external references, not adopted Paperclip-managed resources.

Use the Paperclip-managed flow when Paperclip should create and rotate the value. The AWS secret name is derived from deployment and company scope:

paperclip/{deploymentId}/{companyId}/{secretKey}

Use the external-reference flow when the secret already exists at an operator-owned path such as:

/paperclip-bench/anthropic_api_key

In that mode Paperclip stores only the path or ARN, resolves it at runtime, and records redacted access events. Operators rotate the actual value in AWS. Update the Paperclip reference only when the AWS path, ARN, or pinned provider version changes.

Paperclip does not currently offer an "adopt existing AWS secret" flow that takes over future PutSecretValue writes for an arbitrary existing secret. Adding that later requires explicit confirmation UX, scope validation, expected Paperclip tags, and security/cloud-ops review.

Data Custody

• Paperclip stores externalRef, providerVersionRef, provider id, fingerprint hash, status, and binding metadata.
• Paperclip does not store AWS secret plaintext in company_secret_versions.material.
• Runtime resolution fetches the value from AWS only when a bound consumer needs it.

Rotation Runbook

Manual Paperclip-managed rotation:

1. Write the new value through the Paperclip secret rotate flow.
2. Paperclip creates a new AWS secret version with PutSecretValue.
3. Paperclip records the new providerVersionRef in company_secret_versions.
4. Re-run or restart affected workloads that consume latest, or pin consumers to a specific Paperclip version before rollout when you need staged release safety.

Guidance:

• Prefer pinned Paperclip secret versions for risky rollouts.
• Treat provider-native automatic rotation as a later enhancement; current V1 flow is explicit create-new-version plus controlled rollout.

Backup And Restore Runbook

What must survive:

• Paperclip database metadata for secret ownership, bindings, status, and provider version refs.
• AWS Secrets Manager namespace under the configured deployment prefix.
• The configured KMS key and its decrypt permissions.

Restore checklist:

1. Restore Paperclip database metadata.
2. Confirm the same AWS Secrets Manager namespace still exists.
3. Confirm the Paperclip runtime role can call GetSecretValue on the restored prefix.
4. Confirm the role still has decrypt access to the CMK referenced by PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_KMS_KEY_ID.
5. Run the live smoke below or a targeted runtime secret resolution test.

Provider Outage Runbook

Symptoms:

• Secret create/rotate/resolve operations fail with AWS provider errors.
• Agent runs fail before adapter invocation on required secret resolution.
• Remote import preview fails to list AWS inventory.

Immediate actions:

1. Confirm AWS regional health and Secrets Manager availability.
2. Confirm the runtime role still has GetSecretValue and KMS decrypt permissions.
3. Check for accidental prefix, region, deployment id, or KMS key config drift.
4. Retry a single resolution after AWS service health is green.
5. If outage persists, pause high-risk runs that require secret access rather than churning retries.

Remote import-specific actions:

• Missing list permission: add secretsmanager:ListSecrets with Resource: "*" only when inventory import is approved for that vault's AWS account and Region.
• Throttling: narrow the search, wait briefly, and retry with backoff. Avoid full-account enumeration.
• Invalid or stale cursor: refresh the preview and discard the old NextToken.
• Large account: load pages intentionally, keep one in-flight preview request per vault/search, and do not run background full-account crawls.
• Runtime read failure after import: verify GetSecretValue and KMS decrypt on the selected external secret. Visibility in ListSecrets does not prove read permission.

Incident Response Runbook

Potential incidents:

• Cross-company access caused by IAM scoping drift.
• KMS policy drift causing decrypt failures or over-broad access.
• Suspected secret exposure in logs, transcripts, or downstream agent output.

Response steps:

1. Stop or pause affected Paperclip runs.
2. Audit recent Paperclip secret access events for impacted secret ids and consumers.
3. Audit AWS CloudTrail for ListSecrets, GetSecretValue, PutSecretValue, and DeleteSecret calls on the relevant vault account, Region, deployment prefix, and approved external prefixes.
4. Rotate impacted secrets in AWS through Paperclip-managed versioning.
5. Re-scope IAM and KMS policies before resuming normal traffic.
6. If a value may have reached an agent transcript or external system, treat it as exposed and rotate immediately.

Optional Live Smoke

This is safe to skip locally. Run it only against a dedicated AWS test namespace.

Prerequisites:

• AWS credentials or workload identity with the deployment-scoped IAM permissions above.
• PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_PROVIDER=aws_secrets_manager
• The required PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_* environment variables set.

Suggested smoke:

1. Create a test secret through the Paperclip board or API under a throwaway company.
2. Confirm the resulting AWS secret name matches paperclip/{deploymentId}/{companyId}/{secretKey}.
3. Rotate the secret once and confirm a new providerVersionRef appears in Paperclip metadata.
4. Resolve the secret through a bound runtime path, not by adding a general-purpose reveal endpoint.
5. Delete the throwaway secret and confirm AWS schedules deletion with the configured recovery window.