docs/gateway/secrets.md
OpenClaw supports additive SecretRefs so supported credentials do not need to be stored as plaintext in configuration.
<Note> Plaintext still works. SecretRefs are opt-in per credential. </Note> <Warning> Plaintext credentials remain agent-readable if they are stored in files the agent can inspect, including `openclaw.json`, `auth-profiles.json`, `.env`, or generated `agents/*/agent/models.json` files. SecretRefs reduce that local blast radius only after every supported credential has been migrated and `openclaw secrets audit --check` reports no plaintext secret residue. </Warning>Secrets are resolved into an in-memory runtime snapshot.
This keeps secret-provider outages off hot request paths.
SecretRefs protect credentials from being persisted in supported config and generated model surfaces, but they are not a process-isolation boundary. If a plaintext credential remains on disk in a path the agent can read, the agent can bypass API-level redaction by using file or shell tools to inspect that file.
For production deployments where agent-accessible files are in scope, treat SecretRef migration as complete only when all of these are true:
openclaw.json,
auth-profiles.json, .env, and generated models.json filesopenclaw secrets audit --check is clean after the migrationThis is why the audit/configure/apply workflow is a security migration gate, not just a convenience helper.
<Warning> SecretRefs do not make arbitrary readable files safe. Backups, copied configs, old generated model catalogs, and unsupported credential classes must be treated as production secrets until they are deleted, moved outside the agent trust boundary, or protected by a separate isolation layer. </Warning>SecretRefs are validated only on effectively active surfaces.
SECRETS_REF_IGNORED_INACTIVE_SURFACE.When a SecretRef is configured on gateway.auth.token, gateway.auth.password, gateway.remote.token, or gateway.remote.password, gateway startup/reload logs the surface state explicitly:
active: the SecretRef is part of the effective auth surface and must resolve.inactive: the SecretRef is ignored for this runtime because another auth surface wins, or because remote auth is disabled/not active.These entries are logged with SECRETS_GATEWAY_AUTH_SURFACE and include the reason used by the active-surface policy, so you can see why a credential was treated as active or inactive.
When onboarding runs in interactive mode and you choose SecretRef storage, OpenClaw runs preflight validation before saving:
file or exec): validates provider selection, resolves id, and checks resolved value type.gateway.auth.token is already a SecretRef, onboarding resolves it before probe/dashboard bootstrap (for env, file, and exec refs) using the same fail-fast gate.If validation fails, onboarding shows the error and lets you retry.
Use one object shape everywhere:
{ source: "env" | "file" | "exec", provider: "default", id: "..." }
Supported SecretInput fields also accept exact string shorthands:
```json5
"${OPENAI_API_KEY}"
"$OPENAI_API_KEY"
```
Validation:
- `provider` must match `^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$`
- `id` must match `^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{0,127}$`
Validation:
- `provider` must match `^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$`
- `id` must be an absolute JSON pointer (`/...`)
- RFC6901 escaping in segments: `~` => `~0`, `/` => `~1`
Validation:
- `provider` must match `^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$`
- `id` must match `^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/-]{0,255}$`
- `id` must not contain `.` or `..` as slash-delimited path segments (for example `a/../b` is rejected)
Define providers under secrets.providers:
{
secrets: {
providers: {
default: { source: "env" },
filemain: {
source: "file",
path: "~/.openclaw/secrets.json",
mode: "json", // or "singleValue"
},
vault: {
source: "exec",
command: "/usr/local/bin/openclaw-vault-resolver",
args: ["--profile", "prod"],
passEnv: ["PATH", "VAULT_ADDR"],
jsonOnly: true,
},
},
defaults: {
env: "default",
file: "filemain",
exec: "vault",
},
resolution: {
maxProviderConcurrency: 4,
maxRefsPerProvider: 512,
maxBatchBytes: 262144,
},
},
}
Request payload (stdin):
```json
{ "protocolVersion": 1, "provider": "vault", "ids": ["providers/openai/apiKey"] }
```
Response payload (stdout):
```jsonc
{ "protocolVersion": 1, "values": { "providers/openai/apiKey": "<openai-api-key>" } } // pragma: allowlist secret
```
Optional per-id errors:
```json
{
"protocolVersion": 1,
"values": {},
"errors": { "providers/openai/apiKey": { "message": "not found" } }
}
```
Do not put file:... strings in the config env block. The env block is
literal and non-overriding, so file:... is not resolved.
Use a file SecretRef on a supported credential field instead:
{
secrets: {
providers: {
xai_key_file: {
source: "file",
path: "~/.openclaw/secrets/xai-api-key.txt",
mode: "singleValue",
},
},
},
models: {
providers: {
xai: {
apiKey: { source: "file", provider: "xai_key_file", id: "value" },
},
},
},
}
For mode: "singleValue", the SecretRef id is "value". For
mode: "json", use an absolute JSON pointer such as
"/providers/xai/apiKey".
See SecretRef credential surface for the config fields that accept SecretRefs.
Requirements:
- Bitwarden Secrets Manager CLI (`bws`) installed on the Gateway host.
- `BWS_ACCESS_TOKEN` available to the Gateway service.
- `PATH` passed to the resolver, or `BWS_BIN` set to the absolute `bws`
binary path.
```json5
{
secrets: {
providers: {
bws: {
source: "exec",
command: "/usr/local/bin/openclaw-bws-resolver.mjs",
passEnv: ["BWS_ACCESS_TOKEN", "PATH", "BWS_BIN"],
jsonOnly: true,
},
},
},
models: {
providers: {
openai: {
baseUrl: "https://api.openai.com/v1",
models: [{ id: "gpt-5", name: "gpt-5" }],
apiKey: {
source: "exec",
provider: "bws",
id: "openclaw/providers/openai/apiKey",
},
},
},
},
}
```
The resolver batches requested ids, runs `bws secret list`, and returns
values for matching secret `key` fields. Use keys that satisfy the exec
SecretRef id contract, such as `openclaw/providers/openai/apiKey`; env-var
style keys with underscores are rejected before the resolver runs. If more
than one visible Bitwarden secret has the same requested key, the resolver
fails that id as ambiguous instead of choosing one. After updating config,
verify the resolver path:
```bash
openclaw secrets audit --allow-exec
```
```js
#!/usr/bin/env node
const { spawnSync } = require("node:child_process");
let stdin = "";
process.stdin.setEncoding("utf8");
process.stdin.on("data", (chunk) => {
stdin += chunk;
});
process.stdin.on("error", (err) => {
process.stderr.write(`${err.message}\n`);
process.exit(1);
});
process.stdin.on("end", () => {
let request;
try {
request = JSON.parse(stdin || "{}");
} catch (err) {
process.stderr.write(`Failed to parse request: ${err.message}\n`);
process.exit(1);
}
const passBin = process.env.PASS_BIN || "pass";
const values = {};
const errors = {};
for (const id of request.ids ?? []) {
const result = spawnSync(passBin, ["show", id], { encoding: "utf8" });
if (result.status === 0) {
values[id] = result.stdout.split(/\r?\n/, 1)[0] ?? "";
} else {
errors[id] = { message: (result.stderr || `pass exited ${result.status}`).trim() };
}
}
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ protocolVersion: 1, values, errors }));
});
```
Then configure the exec provider and point `apiKey` at the `pass` entry path:
```json5
{
secrets: {
providers: {
pass_store: {
source: "exec",
command: "/usr/local/bin/openclaw-pass-resolver",
passEnv: ["PATH", "HOME", "GNUPGHOME", "GPG_TTY", "PASSWORD_STORE_DIR", "PASS_BIN"],
jsonOnly: true,
},
},
},
models: {
providers: {
openai: {
baseUrl: "https://api.openai.com/v1",
models: [{ id: "gpt-5", name: "gpt-5" }],
apiKey: {
source: "exec",
provider: "pass_store",
id: "openclaw/providers/openai/apiKey",
},
},
},
},
}
```
Keep the secret on the first line of the `pass` entry, or customize the
wrapper if you want to return the full `pass show` output instead. After
updating config, verify both the static audit and the exec resolver path:
```bash
openclaw secrets audit --check
openclaw secrets audit --allow-exec
```
MCP server env vars configured via plugins.entries.acpx.config.mcpServers support SecretInput. This keeps API keys and tokens out of plaintext config:
{
plugins: {
entries: {
acpx: {
enabled: true,
config: {
mcpServers: {
github: {
command: "npx",
args: ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-github"],
env: {
GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN: {
source: "env",
provider: "default",
id: "MCP_GITHUB_PAT",
},
},
},
},
},
},
},
},
}
Plaintext string values still work. Env-template refs like ${MCP_SERVER_API_KEY} and SecretRef objects are resolved during gateway activation before the MCP server process is spawned. As with other SecretRef surfaces, unresolved refs only block activation when the acpx plugin is effectively active.
The core ssh sandbox backend also supports SecretRefs for SSH auth material:
{
agents: {
defaults: {
sandbox: {
mode: "all",
backend: "ssh",
ssh: {
target: "user@gateway-host:22",
identityData: { source: "env", provider: "default", id: "SSH_IDENTITY" },
certificateData: { source: "env", provider: "default", id: "SSH_CERTIFICATE" },
knownHostsData: { source: "env", provider: "default", id: "SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS" },
},
},
},
},
}
Runtime behavior:
ssh, these refs stay inactive and do not block startup.Canonical supported and unsupported credentials are listed in:
<Note> Runtime-minted or rotating credentials and OAuth refresh material are intentionally excluded from read-only SecretRef resolution. </Note>__OPENCLAW_REDACTED__ is reserved for internal config redaction/restore and is rejected as literal submitted config data.Warning and audit signals:
SECRETS_REF_OVERRIDES_PLAINTEXT (runtime warning)REF_SHADOWED (audit finding when auth-profiles.json credentials take precedence over openclaw.json refs)Google Chat compatibility behavior:
serviceAccountRef takes precedence over plaintext serviceAccount.Secret activation runs on:
secrets.reloadconfig.set / config.apply / config.patch) for active-surface SecretRef resolvability within the submitted config payload before persisting editsActivation contract:
secrets.reload.When reload-time activation fails after a healthy state, OpenClaw enters degraded secrets state.
One-shot system event and log codes:
SECRETS_RELOADER_DEGRADEDSECRETS_RELOADER_RECOVEREDBehavior:
Command paths can opt into supported SecretRef resolution via gateway snapshot RPC.
There are two broad behaviors:
<Tabs> <Tab title="Strict command paths"> For example `openclaw memory` remote-memory paths and `openclaw qr --remote` when it needs remote shared-secret refs. They read from the active snapshot and fail fast when a required SecretRef is unavailable. </Tab> <Tab title="Read-only command paths"> For example `openclaw status`, `openclaw status --all`, `openclaw channels status`, `openclaw channels resolve`, `openclaw security audit`, and read-only doctor/config repair flows. They also prefer the active snapshot, but degrade instead of aborting when a targeted SecretRef is unavailable in that command path.Read-only behavior:
- When the gateway is running, these commands read from the active snapshot first.
- If gateway resolution is incomplete or the gateway is unavailable, they attempt targeted local fallback for the specific command surface.
- If a targeted SecretRef is still unavailable, the command continues with degraded read-only output and explicit diagnostics such as "configured but unavailable in this command path".
- This degraded behavior is command-local only. It does not weaken runtime startup, reload, or send/auth paths.
Other notes:
openclaw secrets reload.secrets.resolve.Default operator flow:
<Steps> <Step title="Audit current state"> ```bash openclaw secrets audit --check ``` </Step> <Step title="Configure and apply SecretRefs"> ```bash openclaw secrets configure --apply ``` </Step> <Step title="Re-audit"> ```bash openclaw secrets audit --check ``` </Step> </Steps>Do not treat the migration as complete until the re-audit is clean. If the audit still reports plaintext values at rest, the agent-access risk is still present even when runtime APIs return redacted values.
If you save a plan instead of applying during configure, apply that saved plan
with openclaw secrets apply --from <plan-path> before the re-audit.
- plaintext values at rest (`openclaw.json`, `auth-profiles.json`, `.env`, and generated `agents/*/agent/models.json`)
- plaintext sensitive provider header residues in generated `models.json` entries
- unresolved refs
- precedence shadowing (`auth-profiles.json` taking priority over `openclaw.json` refs)
- legacy residues (`auth.json`, OAuth reminders)
Exec note:
- By default, audit skips exec SecretRef resolvability checks to avoid command side effects.
- Use `openclaw secrets audit --allow-exec` to execute exec providers during audit.
Header residue note:
- Sensitive provider header detection is name-heuristic based (common auth/credential header names and fragments such as `authorization`, `x-api-key`, `token`, `secret`, `password`, and `credential`).
- configures `secrets.providers` first (`env`/`file`/`exec`, add/edit/remove)
- lets you select supported secret-bearing fields in `openclaw.json` plus `auth-profiles.json` for one agent scope
- can create a new `auth-profiles.json` mapping directly in the target picker
- captures SecretRef details (`source`, `provider`, `id`)
- runs preflight resolution
- can apply immediately
Exec note:
- Preflight skips exec SecretRef checks unless `--allow-exec` is set.
- If you apply directly from `configure --apply` and the plan includes exec refs/providers, keep `--allow-exec` set for the apply step too.
Helpful modes:
- `openclaw secrets configure --providers-only`
- `openclaw secrets configure --skip-provider-setup`
- `openclaw secrets configure --agent <id>`
`configure` apply defaults:
- scrub matching static credentials from `auth-profiles.json` for targeted providers
- scrub legacy static `api_key` entries from `auth.json`
- scrub matching known secret lines from `<config-dir>/.env`
```bash
openclaw secrets apply --from /tmp/openclaw-secrets-plan.json
openclaw secrets apply --from /tmp/openclaw-secrets-plan.json --allow-exec
openclaw secrets apply --from /tmp/openclaw-secrets-plan.json --dry-run
openclaw secrets apply --from /tmp/openclaw-secrets-plan.json --dry-run --allow-exec
```
Exec note:
- dry-run skips exec checks unless `--allow-exec` is set.
- write mode rejects plans containing exec SecretRefs/providers unless `--allow-exec` is set.
For strict target/path contract details and exact rejection rules, see [Secrets Apply Plan Contract](/gateway/secrets-plan-contract).
Safety model:
For static credentials, runtime no longer depends on plaintext legacy auth storage.
api_key entries are scrubbed when discovered.Some SecretInput unions are easier to configure in raw editor mode than in form mode.