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Networking

docs/sdk/python/networking.mdx

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See Networking for conceptual overview and TLS Interception for TLS proxy details.

Network

Frozen dataclass for sandbox network configuration. Use the class method presets for common cases, or construct directly with custom options.

python
Network(
    policy: str | NetworkPolicy | None = None,
    ports: Mapping[int, int] = {},
    deny_domains: tuple[str, ...] = (),
    deny_domain_suffixes: tuple[str, ...] = (),
    dns: DnsConfig | None = None,
    tls: TlsConfig | None = None,
    max_connections: int | None = None,
    trust_host_cas: bool | None = None,
)
FieldTypeDefaultDescription
policystr | NetworkPolicy | NoneNonePreset name or custom NetworkPolicy
portsMapping[int, int]{}Port mappings from host to guest
deny_domainstuple[str, ...]()Deny egress to these exact domains. Each entry adds a deny Domain("...") policy rule that fires at DNS resolution (REFUSED), TLS first-flight (SNI), and TCP egress (cache fallback). Prepended onto the policy so it takes precedence over later allow rules
deny_domain_suffixestuple[str, ...]()Deny egress to all subdomains of these suffixes. Adds deny DomainSuffix("...") rules; same enforcement layers as deny_domains
dnsDnsConfig | NoneNoneDNS interception configuration
tlsTlsConfig | NoneNoneTLS interception configuration
max_connectionsint | NoneNoneMaximum concurrent connections
trust_host_casbool | NoneFalseShip the host's trusted root CAs into the guest at boot so outbound TLS works behind corporate MITM proxies (Warp Zero Trust, Zscaler, etc.). Opt-in

DnsConfig

Frozen dataclass for DNS interception settings.

python
DnsConfig(
    rebind_protection: bool = True,
    nameservers: tuple[str, ...] = (),
    query_timeout_ms: int | None = None,
)
FieldTypeDefaultDescription
rebind_protectionboolTrueBlock DNS responses resolving to private IPs
nameserverstuple[str, ...]()Nameservers (IP, IP:PORT, HOST, or HOST:PORT). Overrides the host's /etc/resolv.conf when set. Hostnames are resolved once at startup via the host's OS resolver
query_timeout_msint | NoneNonePer-DNS-query timeout in milliseconds (default: 5000)

Network.none()

python
@classmethod
def none() -> Network

Deny all traffic. No network interface is created -- the guest is fully offline. exec and fs still work since they use the host-guest channel, not the network.

Returns

TypeDescription
NetworkFully airgapped network configuration

Network.public_only()

python
@classmethod
def public_only() -> Network

Block private address ranges and cloud metadata endpoints. Allow everything else. This is the default policy.

Returns

TypeDescription
NetworkPublic-only network configuration

Network.allow_all()

python
@classmethod
def allow_all() -> Network

Unrestricted network access, including to private addresses and the host machine.

Returns

TypeDescription
NetworkUnrestricted network configuration

Types

NetworkPolicy

Frozen dataclass for a custom network policy. Two per-direction defaults plus an ordered list of rules evaluated first-match-wins per direction.

python
NetworkPolicy(
    default_egress: Action = Action.DENY,
    default_ingress: Action = Action.ALLOW,
    rules: tuple[Rule, ...] = (),
)
FieldTypeDefaultDescription
default_egressActionAction.DENYAction when no egress-applicable rule matches
default_ingressActionAction.ALLOWAction when no ingress-applicable rule matches
rulestuple[Rule, ...]()Rules evaluated first-match-wins per direction

The defaults are asymmetric to preserve today's behavior: egress falls through to deny (today's public_only reachability when paired with the implicit allow public rule), ingress falls through to allow (today's unfiltered published-port behavior). See the defaults rationale.


Rule

Frozen dataclass for a single network policy rule.

python
Rule(
    action: Action,
    direction: Direction = Direction.EGRESS,
    destination: str | None = None,
    protocol: Protocol | None = None,
    port: int | str | None = None,
)
FieldTypeDefaultDescription
actionAction-What to do when this rule matches
directionDirectionDirection.EGRESSWhich evaluator considers this rule. Direction.ANY matches in either direction
destinationstr | NoneNoneTarget filter: a DestGroup value, domain, CIDR range, domain suffix (prefixed with "."), or "*" for any. Domain and suffix strings are validated at sandbox creation; invalid names raise ValueError.
protocolProtocol | NoneNoneProtocol filter
portint | str | NoneNoneSingle port (443) or range ("8000-9000")

Ingress rules carrying ICMP protocols are rejected at sandbox creation: publisher.rs has no inbound ICMP path, so the rule would be dead code. Use Direction.EGRESS for ICMP allow/deny.


Rule.allow()

python
@classmethod
def allow(
    *,
    direction: Direction = Direction.EGRESS,
    protocol: Protocol | None = None,
    port: int | str | None = None,
    destination: str | None = None,
) -> Rule

Create a rule that permits matching traffic.

Parameters

ParameterTypeDefaultDescription
directionDirectionDirection.EGRESSTraffic direction
protocolProtocol | NoneNoneProtocol filter
portint | str | NoneNonePort or port range
destinationstr | NoneNoneDestination filter

Returns

TypeDescription
RuleAn allow rule

Rule.deny()

python
@classmethod
def deny(
    *,
    direction: Direction = Direction.EGRESS,
    protocol: Protocol | None = None,
    port: int | str | None = None,
    destination: str | None = None,
) -> Rule

Create a rule that blocks matching traffic.

Parameters

ParameterTypeDefaultDescription
directionDirectionDirection.EGRESSTraffic direction
protocolProtocol | NoneNoneProtocol filter
portint | str | NoneNonePort or port range
destinationstr | NoneNoneDestination filter

Returns

TypeDescription
RuleA deny rule

TlsConfig

Frozen dataclass for TLS interception settings within Network.

python
TlsConfig(
    bypass: tuple[str, ...] = (),
    verify_upstream: bool = True,
    intercepted_ports: tuple[int, ...] = (443,),
    block_quic: bool = False,
    ca_cert: str | None = None,
    ca_key: str | None = None,
    ca_cn: str | None = None,
)
FieldTypeDefaultDescription
bypasstuple[str, ...]()Domains to skip interception. Use for domains with certificate pinning.
verify_upstreamboolTrueVerify upstream server certificates. Set to False only for self-signed servers.
intercepted_portstuple[int, ...](443,)TCP ports where TLS interception is active
block_quicboolFalseBlock QUIC/HTTP3 (UDP) on intercepted ports, forcing TCP/TLS fallback
ca_certstr | NoneNonePath to a custom interception CA certificate PEM file
ca_keystr | NoneNonePath to a custom interception CA private key PEM file
ca_cnstr | NoneNoneCommon name for the generated interception CA

Action

String enum (StrEnum) for policy actions.

ValueDescription
"allow"Permit the traffic
"deny"Drop the traffic silently

Direction

String enum for traffic direction.

ValueDescription
"egress"Traffic leaving the sandbox
"ingress"Traffic entering the sandbox (via published ports)
"any"Rule applies in either direction

Protocol

String enum for network protocols in policy rules.

ValueDescription
"tcp"TCP traffic
"udp"UDP traffic
"icmpv4"ICMPv4 traffic
"icmpv6"ICMPv6 traffic

PortProtocol

String enum for port-level protocol selection.

ValueDescription
"tcp"TCP port
"udp"UDP port

DestGroup

String enum for well-known destination groups used in Rule.destination.

ValueDescription
"public"Complement of the named categories — every address not in any other group
"private"Private/RFC 1918 addresses + ULA + CGN (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 100.64.0.0/10, fc00::/7)
"loopback"Loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8, ::1) — the guest's own loopback, not the host. See the loopback-vs-host watch-out
"link-local"Link-local addresses (169.254.0.0/16, fe80::/10) excluding metadata
"metadata"Cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254)
"multicast"Multicast addresses (224.0.0.0/4, ff00::/8)
"host"The host machine, reached via host.microsandbox.internal. This is the right group for "let the sandbox reach my host's localhost" — not "loopback"