unbroker

An agent-native skill that finds a consenting person's exposed personal information across data brokers and people-search sites and removes it. It runs automatically wherever it can, and hands off to a human only where a site demands a CAPTCHA it cannot clear, a government ID, a phone call, or a fax.

About

Hundreds of data brokers publish people's names, current and prior addresses, phone numbers, emails, relatives, and property records. That exposure fuels doxxing, stalking, harassment, and identity theft. Removing the data is the documented antidote, but it is high-volume work, full of dark patterns, and perishable (brokers re-list you). Commercial services such as EasyOptOuts, Incogni, and DeleteMe solve this for a fee, but they are closed, and you hand a company you know nothing about the exact data you are trying to erase.

unbroker brings those core capabilities together (EasyOptOuts' automation breadth, Incogni's legal-request engine, DeleteMe's verification and reporting) as a transparent, auditable, self-hosted skill that the user's own agent runs. It is multi-tenant (manage yourself, family, or clients, each isolated), consent-gated, and built for maximum automation with a human fallback. Scope is US-first, with EU/UK (GDPR) and global coverage on the roadmap.

The design is Hermes-native: a small deterministic Python CLI (scripts/pdd.py) owns the state (config, dossiers, broker DB, tier planning, ledger, drafts, reports), while the agent does the scanning and submitting with native tools (web_extract, browser_*, email, cronjob, delegate_task). SKILL.md is the authoritative reference.

Install

hermes skills install official/security/unbroker

Then start a new Hermes session and drive it (below). The skill works zero-config; a few optional env vars unlock more automation (all documented in SKILL.md under Prerequisites):

• BROWSERBASE_API_KEY: the recommended default browser. A real residential-IP cloud browser that clears soft/managed CAPTCHAs (Turnstile, hCaptcha/reCAPTCHA checkbox) as normal operation, so those brokers stay automated. It is not a solver and does not defeat hard challenges.
• Hands-off email, two ways: browser mode (pdd.py setup --email-mode browser, no stored password; the agent sends opt-outs and opens verification links through your logged-in webmail), or EMAIL_ADDRESS + EMAIL_PASSWORD for SMTP send + IMAP verification. Without either, it falls back to writing drafts for you to send.
• the age binary: at-rest encryption of dossiers and ledgers.
• the google-workspace skill: a shared Google Sheets status tracker.

Usage

Drive it from a Hermes session:

"Use the unbroker skill to remove my data from data brokers. Here is my consent. Run it hands-off and show me the human-task digest at the end."

The agent configures itself (setup --auto selects programmatic email if EMAIL_* creds exist, the cloud browser if available, and encryption if age is installed), records your consent, then drains the autonomous queue: scan, opt out (parents first), send and verify emails, schedule re-checks. You hear from it twice: at intake, and with one digest of anything only a human can do.

The underlying CLI (run via terminal, as python3 scripts/pdd.py <cmd>):

How it works

• Autonomous by default. After one human conversation (intake plus consent), the agent drains a deterministic action queue (pdd.py next): scan, opt out parents-first, send and verify emails, re-check on schedule, all without pausing to ask. Human-only work (gov-ID sites, phone callbacks, hard-CAPTCHA sites) accumulates silently into a single end-of-run digest (pdd.py tasks).
• Tiered automation (T0 to T3). Every broker opt-out is classified from fully automated, to automated with verification, to human-verified, to human-only. The agent always takes the highest viable tier and escalates to a human task only when genuinely blocked.
• Cluster parents first. Many brokers are resold shells of a few parents, so one removal can clear a dozen child sites. The planner orders parents ahead of standalone listings and ships field-verified, per-parent playbooks that usually prefer the right-to-delete lane over mere suppression (for example Whitepages' privacy email, which sidesteps the phone-callback tool), with per-broker exceptions where the record says otherwise (PeopleConnect: deleting your user data wipes your suppressions and does not stop public-records re-listing, so suppress-and-maintain instead).
• Multi-identifier fan-out. A person is indexed under every name/alias, phone, email, and address. The planner expands all of them (filtered by what each broker supports) so listings under a maiden name or an old address are found, not just "primary name plus current city".
• Verify before you disclose. Nothing is submitted until a real listing is confirmed, the match is confirmed as the subject and not a namesake or relative, and only the exact fields a broker requires are sent (least-disclosure; SSN and ID numbers are never volunteered).
• Jurisdiction-aware. Requests file under the framework that applies where the subject lives: CCPA/CPRA in California, GDPR in the EU/UK, a general right-to-delete request otherwise. It never cites a right the subject cannot invoke.
• Coverage that matches or exceeds commercial services. Two lanes: (1) people-search sites with per-site opt-out mechanics (19 curated records, including FamilyTreeNow, Radaris, and Nuwber, plus a live pull from BADBOOL), and (2) the state data-broker registries as a distinct legal-coverage lane: the California Data Broker Registry (~545 registered brokers, the authoritative universe the commercial services draw from) is ingested, with Vermont, Oregon, and Texas surfaced as search portals.
• The DROP one-shot. California's Delete Request and Opt-out Platform is live: for a CA resident, a single verified request deletes their data from every registered broker at once, and pdd.py next surfaces it as the highest-leverage action.
• Ledger, audit, and re-scan. Every case is a validated state machine, every PII disclosure is logged (field names only), and confirmed removals are re-scanned on a schedule so a re-listing is caught and re-filed. Ledger writes are file-locked for safe concurrent runs.
• Privacy by default. Opaque subject ids (no name in ids, paths, or logs), optional age at-rest encryption of dossiers, and everything local. The skill ships placeholder data only.

Tests

85 hermetic tests (no network, browser, or email; SMTP and IMAP are exercised through injected fakes):

scripts/run_tests.sh tests/skills/test_unbroker_skill.py           # CI-parity harness
python3 tests/skills/test_unbroker_skill.py                        # dependency-free fallback runner

Safety and ethics

• Consent-gated. The engine refuses to scan or act on a subject without a recorded authorization. It is a removal tool, not a people-search aggregator.
• Sanctioned browser only, no solver farms. The default cloud browser clears soft/managed CAPTCHAs the way any real browser would, but there is no CAPTCHA-solving service and no fingerprint spoofing. Hard interactive challenges escalate to a human task.
• Least-disclosure and honest reporting. The skill submits only what a broker requires. "Hidden from free search" is never reported as "deleted", and residual exposure (public records, paid-tier retention) is disclosed.
• PII handling. Dossiers live under the Hermes home directory (0600, optionally age-encrypted), with opaque ids.

Status

v1.0. The deterministic engine, the autonomous loop, the verified cluster-parent deletion lanes, and full broker-registry coverage (the CA Data Broker Registry plus the DROP one-shot) are built and covered by 85 hermetic tests. The skill ships placeholder data only. Live agent-driven submission against broker sites is the active field-testing frontier.

Credits and license

• Broker dataset adapted from the Big-Ass Data Broker Opt-Out List (BADBOOL) by Yael Grauer, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 (attribution required, non-commercial). See yaelwrites.com.
• Code: MIT.

Disclaimer

This is not legal advice. Only operate on people who have authorized removal of their own data. Removing data from brokers reduces exposure but does not guarantee total erasure. Public records (voter, property, court) and offline vectors are out of scope.