Investigation Templates

Pre-built hypothesis and investigation templates for common supply chain attack scenarios. Each template includes: attack pattern, key evidence to collect, and hypothesis starters.

Template 1: Maintainer Account Compromise

Pattern: Attacker gains access to a legitimate maintainer account (phishing, credential stuffing) and uses it to push malicious code, create backdoored releases, or exfiltrate CI secrets.

Real-world examples: XZ Utils (2024), Codecov (2021), event-stream (2018)

Key Evidence to Collect:

• Push events from maintainer account outside normal working hours/timezone
• Commits adding new dependencies, obfuscated code, or modified build scripts
• Release creation immediately after suspicious push (to maximize package distribution)
• MemberEvent adding unknown collaborators (attacker adding backup access)
• WorkflowRunEvent with unexpected secret access or exfiltration-like behavior
• Account login location changes (check social media, conference talks for corroboration)

Hypothesis Starters:

[HYPOTHESIS] Actor <HANDLE>'s account was compromised on or around <DATE>, 
based on anomalous commit timing [EV-XXXX] and geographic access patterns [EV-YYYY].

[HYPOTHESIS] Release <VERSION> was published by the compromised account to push 
malicious code to downstream users, evidenced by the malicious commit [EV-XXXX] 
being added <N> hours before the release [EV-YYYY].

Template 2: Malicious Dependency Injection

Pattern: A trusted package is modified to include malicious code in a dependency, or a new malicious dependency is injected into an existing package.

Key Evidence to Collect:

• Diff of package.json/requirements.txt/go.mod before and after suspicious commit
• The new dependency's publication timestamp vs. the injection commit timestamp
• Whether the new dependency exists on npm/PyPI and who owns it
• Any obfuscation patterns in the injected dependency code
• Install-time scripts (postinstall, setup.py, etc.) that execute code on install

Hypothesis Starters:

[HYPOTHESIS] Commit <SHA> [EV-XXXX] introduced dependency <PACKAGE@VERSION> 
which appears to be a malicious package published by actor <HANDLE> [EV-YYYY], 
designed to execute <BEHAVIOR> during installation.

Template 3: CI/CD Pipeline Injection

Pattern: Attacker modifies GitHub Actions workflows to steal secrets, exfiltrate code, or inject malicious artifacts into the build output.

Key Evidence to Collect:

• Diff of all .github/workflows/*.yml files before/after suspicious period
• WorkflowRunEvents triggered by the modified workflows
• Any curl, wget, or network calls added to workflow steps
• New or modified env: sections referencing secrets.*
• Artifacts produced by modified workflow runs

Hypothesis Starters:

[HYPOTHESIS] Workflow file <FILE> was modified in commit <SHA> [EV-XXXX] to 
exfiltrate repository secrets via <METHOD>, as evidenced by the added network 
call pattern [EV-YYYY].

Template 4: Typosquatting / Dependency Confusion

Pattern: Attacker registers a package with a name similar to a popular package (or an internal package name) to intercept installs from users who mistype.

Key Evidence to Collect:

• Registration timestamp of the suspicious package on the registry
• Package content: does it contain malicious code or is it a stub?
• Download statistics for the suspicious package
• Names of internal packages that could be targeted (if private repo scope)
• Any references to the legitimate package in the malicious one's metadata

Hypothesis Starters:

[HYPOTHESIS] Package <MALICIOUS_NAME> was registered on <DATE> [EV-XXXX] to 
typosquat on <LEGITIMATE_NAME>, targeting users who misspell the package name. 
The package contains <BEHAVIOR> [EV-YYYY].

Template 5: Force-Push History Rewrite (Evidence Erasure)

Pattern: After a malicious commit is detected (or before wider notice), the attacker force-pushes to remove the malicious commit from branch history.

Detection is key — this template focuses on proving the erasure happened.

Key Evidence to Collect:

• GH Archive PushEvent with distinct_size=0 (force push indicator) [EV-XXXX]
• The SHA of the commit BEFORE the force push (from GH Archive payload.before)
• Recovery of the erased commit via direct URL or git fetch origin SHA
• Wayback Machine snapshot of the commit page before erasure
• Timeline gap in git log (N commits visible in archive but M < N in current repo)

Hypothesis Starters:

[HYPOTHESIS] Actor <HANDLE> force-pushed branch <BRANCH> on <DATE> [EV-XXXX] 
to erase commit <SHA> [EV-YYYY], which contained <MALICIOUS_CONTENT>. 
The erased commit was recovered via <METHOD> [EV-ZZZZ].

Cross-Cutting Investigation Checklist

Apply to every investigation regardless of template:

• Check all contributors for newly created accounts (< 30 days old at time of malicious activity)
• Check if any maintainer account changed email in the period (sign of account takeover)
• Verify GPG signatures on suspicious commits match known maintainer keys
• Check if the repository changed ownership or transferred orgs near the incident
• Look for "cleanup" commits immediately after the malicious commit (cover-up pattern)
• Check related packages/repos by the same author for similar patterns