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Open Secure Subsystem, Root of Trust, Secure Boot, TEE, Side Channel — Research Packet

packages/chip/research/security_2026/00_index.md

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Open Secure Subsystem, Root of Trust, Secure Boot, TEE, Side Channel — Research Packet

Date: 2026-05-19

This packet records a source-backed survey of open hardware and software resources relevant to designing a phone-class secure subsystem for the Eliza E1 SoC: a discrete or integrated Root of Trust (RoT), a fail-closed secure boot chain, OTP/eFuse-backed key storage and lifecycle, a TEE slice for KeyMint and protected services, post-quantum and classical crypto acceleration, hardware RNG / PUF / DICE-style attestation, and side-channel/anti-tamper posture. It maps the existing pre-silicon contract documents (docs/security/threat-model.md, docs/security/boot-image-format.md, docs/security/otp-fuse-map.md, docs/security/avb-a-b-ota.md, docs/security/debug-policy.md, docs/security/key-ceremony.md, docs/security/usb-pd-spec.md, docs/security/test-plan.md, docs/arch/security.md) onto open IP and specifications that can fill the gaps that those documents currently declare BLOCKED.

Files

  • 01_sources/source_inventory.yaml — provenance, URLs, captured points, and claim boundaries. Same schema as research/ai_accelerator_sota/01_sources/source_inventory.yaml.
  • 02_analysis/root_of_trust_landscape.md — OpenTitan, Caliptra (0.x/1.x/2.x), Microsoft Pluton-class analogs, CHERIoT, Tock OS for security cores; fit for E1's currently identity-only boot ROM.
  • 02_analysis/secure_boot_avb_otp.md — AVB 2.0/3.0, U-Boot Verified Boot, EDK2 secure boot, OpenSBI signed payloads, dm-verity / fs-verity, A/B + rollback, OTP/eFuse macros for Sky130/GF180/advanced nodes, and the LOCKED/RMA lifecycle dance.
  • 02_analysis/pqc_and_crypto_accel.md — open AES/ChaCha20-Poly1305, SHA-2/3, Curve25519/Ed25519, NIST PQC (FIPS 203/204/205) HW accelerators, RISC-V Zk crypto extensions, TRNG and SRAM/RO PUFs.
  • 02_analysis/tee_and_confidential_compute.md — Keystone, Penglai, Sanctum, MultiZone, IOPMP, CHERI / CHERIoT, RISC-V CoVE (AP-TEE), RISC-V Smaia/Ssaia AIA, Sscofpmf, Hypervisor 1.0, DICE / Open DICE, IETF RATS, SPDM, Caliptra DPE.
  • 02_analysis/side_channel_and_tamper.md — Spectre/Meltdown class on RV (XiangShan + leakage studies), constant-time/masked crypto, fault injection (voltage/EM/laser), RowHammer mitigation, memory encryption (TDX, SEV-SNP, ARM CCA, RISC-V CoVE memory protection), active mesh and package tamper.
  • 03_implementation/security_path_for_e1.md — High/Med/Low confidence steps tying the open RoT and TEE options to the existing pre-silicon contract files in docs/security/ and docs/arch/security.md, plus the OTP/lifecycle/debug evidence gates already encoded in the fail-closed work order.

Claim Boundary

This packet is research and implementation-planning evidence. Project README claims, vendor pages, and public specifications are treated as directional guidance only. The repository state today is the identity / contract ROM described in docs/arch/security.md. No claim of secure boot, verified boot, debug lock, anti-rollback, KeyMint TEE, attestation, PQC compliance, FIPS 140 certification, or side-channel resistance may be made from this packet alone. Movement of any such claim requires the specific TC-* evidence files listed in docs/security/test-plan.md and the JSON transcript schema referenced there.

Relationship to existing chip research packets

This packet sits alongside the prior 2026-05-19 packets:

  • research/cpu_subsystem_2026/ — open RISC-V cores, RVV, RVH, AIA. Security cross-cuts via PMP/ePMP, IOPMP, Smaia/Ssaia/Sscofpmf, and potential Sanctum/Penglai/Keystone deployment on Rocket or BOOM.
  • research/npu_accelerator_2026/ — open NPU options. Security cross-cuts via accelerator confidential compute (CoVE-IO equivalents, IOPMP-mediated DMA isolation, attested model loading).
  • research/memory_subsystem_2026/ — memory controller / LPDDR options. Security cross-cuts via memory encryption, RowHammer mitigation, on-die ECC interactions with confidential VM memory.
  • research/compiler_runtime_2026/ — host runtime and compiler stack. Security cross-cuts via signed model containers, attested loaders, DICE-derived runtime keys.
  • research/pd_eda_2026/ — open PD/EDA. Security cross-cuts via OTP macro selection on the chosen process node (Sky130 fuse macros vs. intermediate-node antifuse vs. GF22FDX / TSMC N6 OTP).

Date

captured_date: "2026-05-19" matches the rest of the packet set and the docs/project/security-usb-storage-update-fail-closed-work-order-2026-05-17.yaml work order timestamp.