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Privacy Mode v1 Embedded Web Gap

packages/os/linux/variants/milady-tails/docs/privacy-mode-v1-gap.md

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Privacy Mode v1 Embedded Web Gap

Privacy Mode is intended to route elizaOS agent traffic through Tor by booting the live networking stack in Tor-only mode. That covers agent-side requests made from Bun, system tools, and the preserved Tor-managed browser path once the rebuilt ISO passes network validation.

The known v1.0 gap is embedded browser/OAuth traffic launched by the app runtime. The active shell must explicitly prove proxy behavior in Privacy Mode; otherwise external web windows may bypass Tor even when the live OS network stack is in Tor-only mode.

v1.0 Behavior

  • elizaOS agent requests: intended to route through Tor in Privacy Mode; must be verified in the rebuilt ISO.
  • Tor-managed browser behavior: preserved from the upstream live-OS stack.
  • Embedded browser/OAuth windows: not guaranteed to use Tor in v1.0.
  • Mode switching: requires reboot because Privacy Mode is selected from the boot menu.

v1.1 Fix Direction

Patch the active app shell/runtime to inject a Tor proxy when Privacy Mode is active. If CEF/Electrobun is active, that likely means a Chromium proxy flag such as --proxy-server=socks5://127.0.0.1:9050; if WebKit is active, it needs equivalent WebKit/network-context proof. Add an integration check that proves embedded web traffic exits through Tor.

Until that lands, Privacy Mode UX must disclose the embedded web/OAuth caveat anywhere users can open external web content from the elizaOS app.