Secure Boot and Lifecycle Evidence

Status: BLOCKED for production secure boot.

This repository currently contains a e1-chip identity ROM, not a secure boot implementation. The ROM exposes the platform contract words OPSO, CHIP, contract version 1, and a boot-vector placeholder. It has no firmware authentication or lifecycle enforcement.

Current Evidence

Surface	Local evidence	Security result
Boot ROM identity words	rtl/bootrom/e1_bootrom.sv and platform-contract checks	Contract ROM only; not a trust anchor.
Boot ROM write behavior	verify/cocotb/test_e1_lifecycle.py writes ROM offsets and verifies reads stay fixed	Negative evidence that the current ROM is immutable through the MMIO path.
Lifecycle state	No lifecycle RTL, registers, pins, or reset straps	BLOCKED.
eFuse/OTP	No fuse macro, fuse shadow registers, or provisioning flow	BLOCKED.
Root key material	No key hash, public key, certificate chain, or device-unique key source	BLOCKED.
Image authentication	No ROM hash parser, signature verifier, manifest parser, or fail-closed branch	BLOCKED.
Rollback protection	No monotonic counter, version fuse, RPMB, or anti-rollback policy	BLOCKED.
Debug authentication	Package debug bridge is a bring-up bus master; no lifecycle-gated authentication	BLOCKED for production debug lock.

Required Evidence Before Any Secure-Boot Claim

The first claim may only be "development secure boot prototype" after all of these artifacts exist and are locally reproducible:

• ROM source or ROM image hash with a deterministic build log.
• Machine-readable ROM manifest format covering load address, length, image version, hash algorithm, signature algorithm, and key identifier.
• Signature verification implementation and negative tests for corrupted image, corrupted signature, wrong key, unsupported algorithm, truncated manifest, and rollback version.
• Fail-closed boot behavior proving unauthenticated images cannot transfer control to the application CPU.
• Lifecycle state encoding with reset behavior for at least raw, development, production, RMA, and invalid states.
• eFuse/OTP model or silicon macro integration evidence, including default erased values, programmed values, read visibility, write lock, and redundancy or error handling policy.
• Root key provisioning procedure, key ceremony record, custody roles, and test vectors using non-production keys.
• Authenticated debug policy showing which lifecycle states permit debug, which secrets are scrubbed, and which unlock tokens are accepted or rejected.
• Formal or simulation evidence that lifecycle-invalid encodings fail closed.
• Documentation that explicitly separates development/test keys from production keys.

Non-Claims

Do not claim production secure boot, verified boot, device identity, hardware-backed key storage, secure debug, anti-rollback, or Android AVB enforcement from the current RTL. Those are future requirements, not present features.