Clash Party Provider Integration v2

Client spec: cpx-plugin/2.

Chinese reference document: 机场服务端对接指南-v2.md.

Related files:

• Reference gateway: deploy/gateway/
• Sign test vectors: src/main/resolve/plugin/__fixtures__/sign-vectors.json

During development there was an earlier v1 design (password + encrypted container). That design has been retired, and the current codebase does not include a v1 implementation.

1. Integration Model

The client must not receive the real subscription URL, API host, or origin token.

The user imports a public .cpx descriptor. Login happens in the system browser. The client generates an Ed25519 device key pair locally. Subscription updates then use a gateway challenge/config flow.

Provider-side components:

The login host is the trust root and is fixed in distributed .cpx files. The gateway host is discovered at runtime and can be rotated by updating the well-known document.

Failure behavior:

Flow:

Install:
  Import .cpx
  Validate descriptor
  Create local record; no network request yet

Login:
  1. GET https://<login-host>/.well-known/cpx-gateway
  2. Generate Ed25519 device key pair and deviceId(UUIDv4)
  3. Open system browser:
     loginUrl?response_type=code&code_challenge=...&state=...
  4. Provider login page redirects to:
     http://127.0.0.1:<port>/callback?code=...&state=...
  5. POST {gateway}/enroll with code and PKCE verifier
  6. POST {gateway}/challenge
  7. POST {gateway}/config with Ed25519 signature
  8. Store returned Clash YAML as a normal profile

Update:
  Repeat challenge -> config. No browser is opened.

Re-login:
  Gateway returns {"error":"revoked"} or {"error":"device_revoked"}.
  Client marks the profile as needs re-authentication.

Delete:
  Client best-effort calls /revoke, then deletes local state.

2. Reference Gateway

deploy/gateway/ is the reference implementation. It includes Docker deployment, a SQLite account store, and cpx-admin.

Important files:

For an existing panel, the usual additions are:

1. A device binding table: user_id, device_id, device_pubkey, created_at.
2. Pending nonce storage: Redis, memory, or database; short TTL; delete after use.
3. An OAuth authorize endpoint backed by the existing login system.
4. /.well-known/cpx-gateway.
5. Four gateway endpoints that call existing user-status and subscription-generation logic.

3. .cpx Descriptor

.cpx is public JSON. Use one file for all users. It must not contain user data, tokens, API hosts, gateway hosts, or subscription URLs.

{
  "magic": "CPXF",
  "v": 2,
  "spec": "cpx-plugin/2",
  "loginUrl": "https://panel.example.com/oauth/authorize",
  "provider": {
    "name": "Example",
    "icon": "...",
    "site": "https://example.com"
  }
}

Field rules:

loginUrl is the OAuth authorize endpoint, not a generic login page. The client appends OAuth parameters to it.

Generator:

node scripts/plugin/gen-cpx.mjs <loginUrl> <providerName> [site] [output]

4. OAuth Authorize

Use OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code + PKCE(S256). The client opens the system browser. Credentials are submitted only to the provider page.

Client query parameters:

Authorize endpoint requirements:

1. Allow loopback redirect URI http://127.0.0.1:<random-port>/callback. The port changes per login.
2. After successful login, redirect to redirect_uri?code=...&state=....
3. The issued code must be one-time and expire in no more than 60 seconds.
4. Store user_id, redirect_uri, client_id, and code_challenge with the code.
5. /enroll must compare stored redirect_uri and client_id byte-for-byte.

Loopback redirect uses HTTP for native apps; do not reject it for not being HTTPS. See RFC 8252.

5. Gateway Discovery

The client requests the exact host from loginUrl:

GET https://<login-host>/.well-known/cpx-gateway

Response:

{
  "spec": "cpx-plugin/2",
  "gateway": "https://gw.front.example.net",
  "endpoints": {
    "enroll": "/enroll",
    "challenge": "/challenge",
    "config": "/config",
    "revoke": "/revoke"
  }
}

Field rules:

The discovery request uses HTTPS only, does not follow redirects, and caps the response body at 64 KiB. Non-2xx, invalid JSON, or invalid fields are discovery failures.

Gateway Rotation

To rotate the gateway, update /.well-known/cpx-gateway.

The client rediscovers and retries once when the cached gateway returns:

• HTTP 410;
• JSON {"error":"gateway_retired"};
• network-level failure, such as DNS failure, connection failure, or TLS handshake failure.

Plain 5xx, 429, and timeouts are treated as transient failures. They do not trigger rediscovery.

Rediscovery requires the login host to be reachable.

6. Gateway Common Rules

All gateway endpoints are POST with JSON request bodies. The client uses HTTPS only, does not follow redirects, and caps responses at 10 MiB.

No Authorization header is used. No bearer token is issued. Device identity is based on deviceId, the stored Ed25519 public key, and request signatures.

Client error classification:

For expired accounts, disabled users, or revoked devices, include revoked or device_revoked in the JSON body. A bare 401 or 403 is treated as transient.

7. POST {gateway}/enroll

Purpose: exchange an authorize code for a device binding. This is similar to OAuth token exchange, but no bearer token is returned.

Request:

{
  "code": "<authorize code>",
  "code_verifier": "<PKCE verifier>",
  "redirect_uri": "http://127.0.0.1:<port>/callback",
  "client_id": "mihomo-party",
  "devicePubKey": "<base64 Ed25519 public key>",
  "deviceId": "<UUIDv4>"
}

Server steps:

1. Find code; verify it is unexpired and unused.
2. Verify PKCE: BASE64URL(SHA256(code_verifier)) == code_challenge.
3. Compare redirect_uri and client_id with the stored values byte-for-byte.
4. Resolve user_id from the code.
5. Store (user_id, deviceId, devicePubKey).
6. Mark the code as used.
7. Return 2xx, for example {"ok":true}.

Notes:

• deviceId is client-generated. Do not replace it.
• A user may have multiple devices. Apply a device-count limit or cleanup policy.
• If enroll succeeds but the first config fetch fails, keep the device binding.
• Re-login creates a new key pair and a new device binding.

8. POST {gateway}/challenge

Purpose: issue a one-time nonce for a device.

Request:

{ "deviceId": "<UUIDv4>" }

Success response:

{
  "nonceId": "<opaque id>",
  "nonce": "<base64 32 bytes>",
  "exp": 60
}

Rules:

• Keep a pending-nonce pool per deviceId.
• Allow several pending nonces for concurrency.
• nonce is 32 cryptographically random bytes.
• TTL should be no more than 60 seconds.
• Delete nonce after use; clean expired nonces.
• Limit pending nonces per device, for example 8.
• nonceId is an opaque visible ASCII handle, length <= 64, with no spaces or control characters.
• nonce uses standard base64 with = padding; decoded length must be exactly 32 bytes.
• exp is informational.

For an unknown device, expired account, or revoked device, return:

{ "error": "revoked" }

9. POST {gateway}/config

Purpose: verify the device signature and return the user's Clash YAML.

Request:

{
  "deviceId": "<UUIDv4>",
  "nonceId": "<challenge nonceId>",
  "nonce": "<challenge nonce>",
  "ts": 1700000000000,
  "sig": "<base64 Ed25519 signature>"
}

Server steps:

1. Look up the pending nonce by deviceId and nonceId.
2. Verify request nonce matches the stored value.
3. Verify the nonce is unexpired and unconsumed.
4. Check clock skew: abs(now_ms - ts) <= 300000.
5. Load devicePubKey for the device.
6. Build the canonical sign input from section 11 with op=1.
7. Verify the Ed25519 signature.
8. Consume the nonce.
9. Resolve user_id from deviceId.
10. Generate the subscription internally or fetch it from a hidden origin.
11. Return HTTP 200 with Clash YAML as the response body.

Successful /config response is not JSON. The client parses it as Clash YAML and requires an object containing at least proxies or proxy-providers.

Do not return the subscription URL, origin API host, or origin token.

10. POST {gateway}/revoke

Purpose: unbind a device. The client calls this best-effort when the user deletes the plugin.

Request body is the same as /config.

Use the same verification flow as /config, but build the sign input with op=2. After successful verification, remove the deviceId binding and consume the nonce.

/revoke must be idempotent. Return 2xx even if the device is already absent.

11. Device Signature

Canonical sign input:

SignInput = "CPX2"                              // 4 bytes ASCII
          | uint8(op)                           // config=1, revoke=2
          | uint8(len(deviceId)) | deviceId     // UTF-8 bytes
          | uint8(len(nonceId))  | nonceId      // UTF-8 bytes
          | nonce                               // 32 raw bytes
          | uint64_be(ts)                       // Unix milliseconds

Signature:

sig = Ed25519_sign(devicePrivKey, SignInput)

sig is 64 raw bytes on input to standard base64.

Implementation notes:

• Decode nonce from base64 before adding it to SignInput.
• Encode ts as an 8-byte unsigned big-endian integer.
• deviceId and nonceId length prefixes are one unsigned byte.
• /config uses op=1; /revoke uses op=2.

12. Wire Encoding

Only PKCE fields use base64url without padding. Binary protocol fields use standard base64 with padding.

13. PHP Snippet

PKCE:

function pkce_ok(string $verifier, string $challenge): bool {
    $calc = rtrim(strtr(base64_encode(hash('sha256', $verifier, true)), '+/', '-_'), '=');
    return hash_equals($challenge, $calc);
}

Signature verification:

function build_sign_input(int $op, string $deviceId, string $nonceId, string $nonceRaw, int $tsMs): string {
    return "CPX2"
        . chr($op)
        . chr(strlen($deviceId)) . $deviceId
        . chr(strlen($nonceId)) . $nonceId
        . $nonceRaw
        . pack('J', $tsMs); // uint64 big-endian
}

$nonceRaw = base64_decode($req['nonce'], true);
$pub      = base64_decode($devicePubKeyB64, true);
$sig      = base64_decode($req['sig'], true);
$ts       = (int)$req['ts'];

if ($nonceRaw === false || $pub === false || $sig === false) { /* 400 */ }
if (strlen($nonceRaw) !== 32 || strlen($pub) !== 32 || strlen($sig) !== 64) { /* 400 */ }
if (abs((int)(microtime(true) * 1000) - $ts) > 300000) { /* 400 */ }

// Also check nonceId/nonce belongs to deviceId and is unexpired/unconsumed.

$op    = ($endpoint === 'config') ? 1 : 2;
$input = build_sign_input($op, $req['deviceId'], $req['nonceId'], $nonceRaw, $ts);
$ok    = sodium_crypto_sign_verify_detached($sig, $input, $pub);
if (!$ok) { /* 401 or 400 */ }

// Consume nonce after successful verification.

Revocation response:

http_response_code(403);
header('Content-Type: application/json');
echo json_encode(['error' => 'revoked']);

14. Test Vectors

File:

src/main/resolve/plugin/__fixtures__/sign-vectors.json

Each vector contains:

• op
• deviceId
• nonceId
• privSeedB64
• pubKeyB64
• nonceB64
• ts
• inputHex
• sigB64

Verify:

1. Your canonical input hex equals inputHex.
2. sigB64 verifies under pubKeyB64.

Regenerate vectors:

node scripts/plugin/gen-sign-vectors.mjs

15. Launch Checklist

Descriptor:

• .cpx contains only valid v2 fields.
• loginUrl is an HTTPS authorize endpoint with no query, fragment, or userinfo.
• Optional icon uses an allowed data URI format and size.

Login host:

• /.well-known/cpx-gateway returns valid JSON.
• authorize accepts http://127.0.0.1:<random-port>/callback.
• successful login redirects with code and original state.
• code is one-time and TTL <= 60 seconds.
• code stores redirect_uri, client_id, and code_challenge.

Gateway:

• gateway is a public HTTPS origin.
• endpoint paths are relative and contain no backslash, query, or fragment.
• /enroll verifies PKCE, code, redirect URI, and client ID.
• /challenge issues 32-byte standard-base64 nonce values with short TTL and pool limits.
• /config verifies nonce, clock skew, signature, consumes nonce, and returns Clash YAML.
• /revoke verifies with op=2, consumes nonce, and idempotently unbinds the device.
• account/device revocation returns {"error":"revoked"} or {"error":"device_revoked"}.
• gateway retirement returns HTTP 410 or {"error":"gateway_retired"}.

Compatibility:

• devicePubKey, sig, and nonce use standard base64 with padding.
• PKCE uses base64url without padding.
• sign input uses raw nonce bytes, not the base64 string.
• ts is encoded as uint64 big-endian.
• implementation passes sign-vectors.json.

16. Logging

Do not log:

• authorize code
• code_verifier
• nonce or nonceId
• user password or raw login form
• subscription URL, origin token, or full Clash YAML

Safe operational fields include user_id, deviceId, endpoint name, status code, duration, and gateway version.