ContextQMD
Back to Activepieces

EE Authentication (SSO/RBAC)

brain/knowledge/connections-auth/ee-authentication-sso-rbac.md

0.88.37.3 KB
Original Source

EE Authentication (SSO/RBAC)

Enterprise auth layer extending CE with SAML 2.0 SSO, Google/GitHub federated OAuth, OTP email flows, per-project RBAC, and managed-auth JWT exchange for embedding. All SSO paths delegate to authenticationService.federatedAuthn() which creates/links a user and issues a standard AP JWT.

Entities & services

  • saml-authn/, federated-authn/, otp/, enterprise-local-authn/, project-role/ (RBAC), ee-authorization.ts (preHandler hooks), managed-authn/.
  • platform.federatedAuthProviders stores { saml: {entityId, ssoUrl, certificate}, google: {clientId, clientSecret} }.

How it works

  • SAML SSO: POST /v1/authn/saml/login returns IdP redirect; IdP POSTs assertion to ACS POST /v1/authn/saml/acs; service parses email/name → federatedAuthn → JWT. Gated by platform.plan.ssoEnabled.
  • Federated OAuth (Google/GitHub): /v1/authn/federated/login returns redirect URL; /v1/authn/federated/claim exchanges code → JWT. Redirects always use FRONTEND_URL (no custom domain).
  • OTP (EMAIL_VERIFICATION, PASSWORD_RESET, EMAIL_LOGIN): per-type expiry (OTP_EXPIRATION_MS in otp-service.ts: 24h verification, 10-min reset, 10-min login); states PENDING/CONFIRMED; one row per (identityId, type), DB-enforced. Resend re-delivers the existing pending value WITHOUT touching the row — expiry stays anchored to the value's creation, so resends cannot extend a (possibly compromised) OTP's lifetime; a new value is generated only once the old one is expired or spent (GIT-1733: the old early-return made resend a silent 204 no-op). The first two types carry a randomUUID() delivered as a link; EMAIL_LOGIN carries a 6-digit code the member types, and its row counts attempts so it dies after five wrong guesses — counted in raw SQL for the same reason resend leaves the row alone, since touching updated would buy the guesser another window. Known bounded edge: a resend requested just before expiry delivers a short-lived link; the next resend regenerates. See 000027.
  • Enterprise local auth: verifyEmail (confirms OTP → sets verified), resetPassword (confirms OTP → updates hash), both audit-logged.
  • RBAC: assertPrincipalAccessToProject({principal, permission, projectId}) and assertUserHasPermissionToFlow (maps FlowOperationType → Permission). Authorization hooks: platformMustHaveFeatureEnabled (402 FEATURE_DISABLED), projectMustBeTeamType, platformMustBeOwnedByCurrentUser.

Gotchas

  • Until the passwordless work, CE could not send an OTP at all, despite the entity being registered for every edition. otpModule was registered only in the CLOUD and ENTERPRISE arms of app.ts, and emailService.sendOtp returned early when the edition was neither. So on CE the table existed, the migration ran, and nothing could ever be sent. EMAIL_LOGIN changed that: otpModule is now registered for COMMUNITY too, and EMAIL_LOGIN is the one type carved out of the paid-edition send gate, so it reaches every edition while the UI gates it on SMTP_CONFIGURED. The two link types are still paid-edition only. RBAC base types are CE; SSO, managed auth, federated OAuth are EE/Cloud only.
  • The public POST /v1/otp route deliberately cannot mint a login code. Its CreateOtpRequestBody narrows type to EMAIL_VERIFICATION | PASSWORD_RESET, because that route is unauthenticated, carries no rateLimit config, and applies none of the sign-up guards. EMAIL_LOGIN is issued only through POST /v1/authentication/otp/request, which is rate limited and gated. Widening that enum back to the whole OtpType hands anyone an unthrottled "email a working sign-in code to this address" primitive.
  • A code sign-in must re-assert the platform's auth policy at verify time, not only at request time. On Cloud platformUtils.getPlatformIdForRequest returns null for every unauthenticated request, so the request-scoped branch never runs there and the platform is only known after the identity is resolved. verifyCode therefore calls the same assertEmailAuthIsEnabled + assertDomainIsAllowed pair on the resolved preferred platform; without that, an email code signs a member into a platform that has deliberately disabled email auth or removed their domain. It is not asserted at request time on purpose, because reporting those errors for a resolved address would turn the request endpoint into an existence oracle.
  • otpService.confirm used to refresh its own resend lock. updated is an updateDate column, so marking a row CONFIRMED touched it and the ten-minute guard then refused to issue that identity another code for ten minutes after a successful verify. Rows are deleted on confirm now.
  • One constant is both the expiry and the resend suppression. TEN_MINUTES gates confirm's freshness check and createAndSend's "an OTP already exists" early return, so before this work a resend was impossible until the current credential expired, and the request endpoint still answered 204. Resend now re-delivers the existing value without touching updated.
  • email-service.ts is not exhaustive over OtpType. frontendPath is a literal keyed by only two members but indexed by the whole union, so adding a member is a compile break; its sibling otpToTemplate is typed Record<string, EmailTemplateData>, which type-checks and hands undefined to the sender at runtime instead.
  • SSO settings page wrapped in LockedFeatureGuard keyed on ssoEnabled.
  • Managed auth gated separately by embeddingEnabled (signing keys). See the Managed Auth page.
  • The authn rate limiter (core/security/rate-limit.ts) is registered with global: false — it protects NOTHING by default. Every public endpoint that sends email or does auth work must opt in per-route via config.rateLimit (see authentication.controller.ts / otp-controller.ts for the API_RATE_LIMIT_AUTHN_* pattern).

Key files

Entry point: assertPrinicpalAccessToProject (yes, misspelled in the source), exported from project-role/rbac-service.ts and called from core/security/v2/authz/authorize.ts on every project-scoped request.

  • packages/server/api/src/app/ee/authentication/ — EE auth module root: saml-authn/, federated-authn/, otp/, enterprise-local-authn/, project-role/ (RBAC service + middleware), and ee-authorization.ts plan/ownership hooks
  • packages/server/api/src/app/core/security/v2/authz/ — where RBAC gets wired into request authorization
  • packages/server/api/src/app/ee/managed-authn/ — managed auth JWT exchange for the embedding SDK
  • packages/core/shared/src/lib/ee/authn/ — shared enterprise authn exports, ACL types, verify-email and reset-password DTOs
  • packages/core/shared/src/lib/ee/otp/ — OTP model schema and the OtpType enum
  • packages/web/src/features/authentication/ — sign-in form, third-party login buttons, verify email, reset password, auth hooks, managed auth client
  • packages/web/src/app/routes/platform/security/sso/ — SSO settings page, SAML dialog, allowed domains dialog
  • packages/web/src/app/routes/authenticate/ — SAML ACS callback landing page

Paths verified 2026-07-17. An earlier version pointed at sso/oauth2-dialog.tsx; that file is gone and Google is now a plain googleAuthEnabled toggle on the SSO page, so it was dropped.